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For a sample of large European banks, during 2010-2016, we construct a novel measure 
(SovRisk) which captures the riskiness of sovereign bond portfolios. We demonstrate the 
ability of this measure to explain the different phases of the European sovereign debt crisis, 
while accounting for the substantial differences among distressed and non-distressed 
countries. We contend that SovRisk can be used as complement to bank Credit Default Swap 
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The sovereign-bank nexus attracted widespread attention during the European sovereign debt 
crisis. The strong interconnection between bank and sovereign risk, especially for institutions 
operating in distressed euro area countries, renewed the focus on the prudential treatment of 
banks’ sovereign bond holdings. This was of policy importance for both financial stability 
and monetary policy concerns. Notable contributions (Acharya et al., 2014; Farhi and Tirole, 
2017, among others) document the existence of multiple risk transmission channels feeding 
the two-way vicious loop between banks and sovereigns. Framed within the current debate on 
how to successfully reduce risk in European banking and complete the post-crisis reform 
agenda, an accurate appreciation of the inherent riskiness of banks’ sovereign bond portfolios 
is of primary importance. 
 
While an extensive strand of prior literature has focused on investigating the determinants of 
both size and risk of banks’ sovereign debt exposures in Europe (Acharya and Steffen, 2015; 
Ongena et al., 2019), limited attention has been devoted to develop a quantitative measure to 
quantify the risk associated with these exposures. Previous empirical studies mostly employ 
CDS spreads to assess the riskiness of both sovereigns and banks and the associated 
sovereign-bank nexus in Europe (Acharya et al., 2014; Fratzscher and Rieth, 2019, among 
others). However, although the widespread use of spreads on CDS contracts as proxies for 
default risk, a number of authoritative contributions (Annaert et al., 2013; Avino and Cotter, 
2014; Fontana and Scheicher, 2016) underline significant challenges in using these 
indicators. In a nutshell, especially in periods of significant distress, CDS spreads tend to 
capture wider market dynamics, thereby failing in solely grasping banks’ debt riskiness.  
 
In this paper, we create a novel and alternative indicator, SovRisk, which focuses on 
weighted country-by-country banks’ sovereign bond exposures and links them with the 
specific risk profile of each selected country. Our measure, which consists of two key 
components that capture (i) a bank’s exposure towards a specific sovereign and (ii) the actual 
risk of such exposure, is believed to mitigate the controversial effect of wider market 
dynamics, compared to CDS spreads, while effectively measuring the overall riskiness of a 
bank’s sovereign debt portfolio. Moreover, while CDS spreads are available mostly for large 
listed banks, by linking accounting to market-based information, SovRisk can be employed to 
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investigate the sovereign risk exposure for wider samples of banks. For 51 large banks from 
19 European countries, we construct SovRisk on the basis of a publicly available and 
granular dataset from the European Banking Authority (EBA).1 We consider a time frame 
that covers both a distressed (namely, the European sovereign debt crisis, started in late 2009) 
and a more tranquil period, following the ECB’s intervention, in mid-2012, to prevent the 
collapse of the euro area.  
 
We test the reliability of SovRisk in several ways. First, we test its capability to capture the 
different phases of sovereign default risk that characterised the European context during 
2010-2016. Specifically, we explore whether banks located in stressed (Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) and non-stressed countries, with heterogenous 
financial and fiscal conditions, present different risk exposures in their sovereign bond 
portfolios.2 Second, we check whether the trend of SovRisk is similar to that of bank CDS 
spreads. Finally, in a regression-setting, we explore the relationship between SovRisk and 
both bank-specific and macroeconomic factors and compare the results to both the evidence 
for bank CDS spreads and prior literature on bank exposure to sovereign distress in Europe. 
 
2. Empirical methodology and data 
SovRisk for a bank i at time t is defined as follows:  





𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑡 = 1 + (10𝑌 𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑡 − 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡) 
and: 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡/𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 
 
Spreadjt is the spread between the 10-year yield on a sovereign bond for a country j at time t 
and the 10-year German bund, as a benchmark. Sovexpcountryjt is the weighted sovereign 
 
1 The sample includes banks that were subject to either the EBA EU-wide stress tests or transparency exercises 
during 2010-2016. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the list of banks included in the sample. 
2 Stressed countries, compared to non-stressed countries, were perceived as having higher sovereign default and 
liquidity risks during the European sovereign debt crisis (Altavilla et al., 2017; Wei et al., 2018). European non-
stressed countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and United Kingdom.    
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exposure of bank i towards each country j at time t. The higher the value of SovRisk, the 
higher the risk of the corresponding bank sovereign bond portfolio.  
In a second stage of our analysis, we employ the System-Generalised Method of Moments 
(S-GMM) estimator, two-step procedure, in order to account for the potential endogeneity of 
the determinants of banks’ sovereign bond holdings (Gennaioli et al., 2018; Affinito et al., 
2019). The econometric equation is specified as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is our dependent variable (SovRisk or, alternatively, the logarithm of bank CDS spreads) 
for bank i at time t.3 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged value of the dependent variable, included to control 
for time persistence. Vector X comprises a set of lagged bank-specific variables, commonly 
employed in banking literature (e.g. Gennaioli et al., 2018; Affinito et al., 2019), as proxies 
for bank size (Size), loans outstanding (Lending), non-performing loans (NPLs), 
capitalisation (CET1), profitability (ROE), liquidity (Liquidity), business model orientation 
(Business model) and solvency (Z-score). Vector Z consists of exogenous country-level 
factors, such as short-term interest rates (STrate), the amount of sovereign debt (SovDebt) 
and GDP growth (GDP), able to influence banks’ preference to purchase sovereign bonds. 
Year fixed-effects (𝜇𝑡) are included. Robust standard errors, corrected according to 
Windmeijer (2005), are clustered at bank level. 
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 shows the development of the average value of SovRisk, for the entire sample of 
banks, during 2010-2016. SovRisk effectively captures the different phases of the European 
sovereign debt crisis (the right hand side of Figure 1). It peaks during the most acute phase of 
the crisis, in 2012, driven by a contemporaneous increase in banks’ amount and riskiness of 
sovereign bond holdings, to then decrease afterwards. In addition, when splitting the sample 
between stressed and non-stressed European countries, SovRisk reveals a similar trend. 
However, its magnitude differs substantially during 2010-2016, with stressed banks holding 
larger and riskier amounts of sovereign debt compared to non-stressed banks.4  
 
 
3 We employ bank 5Y senior CDS contracts collected from Datastream.   
4 T-test of mean differences indicates that SovRisk stressed and SovRisk non-stressed means are statistically 
different from zero at the 5% level.  
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In order to provide further evidence on the reliability of our metric, we conduct a visual 
comparison of the trends for the average values of SovRisk and bank CDS spreads. The test 
is based on a restricted sample of 33 banks, depending on the availability for CDS data 
(Figure 2). During 2010-2014, inclusive of the most acute phase of the European sovereign 
debt crisis, the related trends appear to be similar for both the stressed and non-stressed sub-
groups.5 
 
The findings for the S-GMM, as displayed in Table 1, demonstrate similarities between the 
main determinants of SovRisk (column 1) and bank CDS spreads (column 2). Furthermore, 
in-line with prior literature on bank exposure to sovereign distress, our results highlight an 
inverse relationship between Size and SovRisk, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Smaller banks tend to hold riskier sovereign bonds (Altavilla et al., 2017). The lending 
variable exhibits a negative relation with SovRisk, statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Banks that either face lending constrains or limited demand for loans might have an incentive 
to buy more and riskier amounts of sovereign debt in order to support profitability (Acharya 
et al., 2015, Altavilla et al., 2017). Finally, banks with lower amounts of NPLs tend to 
increase the riskiness of their sovereign bond holdings, likely because they are subject to less 
operational constraints. Among the macroeconomic variables, we find that banks located in 
countries with larger amounts of sovereign debt (to GDP) are more prone to hold riskier 
sovereign bonds. This evidence might be driven by the greater “home-bias” of the sovereign 
bond portfolios of stressed banks.  
 
4. Conclusions 
We construct a novel measure (SovRisk) to assess the riskiness of European banks’ sovereign 
bond portfolios. We test its capability to capture the various phases of the European 
sovereign debt crisis, for both stressed and non-stressed banks. When compared with CDS 
spreads, we argue that SovRisk represents a reliable indicator of the banks’ sovereign risk 
exposure, which can also be employed in the absence of traded bank CDS. Finally, we find 
the results of our dynamic panel data regression to be consistent with prior literature on 
banks’ exposure to sovereign risk in Europe, as well as with the evidence for bank CDS 
spreads.  
 
5 From 2015, for stressed banks, the trends start to diverge. We argue that the introduction of the EU Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), and associated bail-in mechanism, is likely to have played an 
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Figure 1. Development of SovRisk, 2010-2016.  
  
Note: On the left refers the average value of SovRisk for the whole sample, whilst on the right the average value of SovRisk 
for stressed (green line, left y axis) and non-stressed (dashed red line, right y axis) countries.  
 
Figure 2. Development of SovRisk and bank CDS spreads, 2010-2016. 
    
Note: On the left refers the average value of SovRisk (green line, left y axis) and bank CDS spreads (dashed red line, right y 
axis) for stressed countries, whilst on the right the average value of SovRisk (green line, left y axis) and bank CDS spreads 
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Table 1. Riskiness of banks’ sovereign bond portfolios (S-GMM), 2010-2016. 
  (1) (2) 
  SovRisk Bank CDS spreads 
   
SovRiskt−1 0.2778***  
 (0.1242)  
Bank CDS spreadst−1  0.6500** 
  (0.0665) 
Sizet−1 -0.0409*** -0.0577*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0212) 
Lendingt−1 -0.0016** -0.0010 
 (0.0007) (0.0018) 
NPLst−1 -0.0030*** -0.0089*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0023) 
CET1t−1 -0.0337 -0.7907 
 (0.4271) (0.9457) 
ROEt−1 -0.0006 -0.0062** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Liquidityt−1 -0.0006 -0.0323 
 (0.0020) (0.0028) 
Business modelt−1 -0.0005 0.0217*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0083) 
Z-score -0.0002 -0.0099** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) 
STrate 0.0214 0.0210 
 (0.0216) (0.0499) 
SovDebt 0.0028*** 0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) 
GDP -0.0009 0.0005 
 (0.0028) (0.0036) 
N. Obs. 304 192 
N. Banks 51 32 
AR2 Test 0.256 0.299 
Hansen Test 0.135 0.167 
N. Instruments 32 32 
Year Fe Yes Yes 
 
Note: Corrected robust standard errors are clustered at bank level and reported in parentheses. The p-values for the Arellano 
and Bond test for second order autocorrelation in the residuals (AR2), as well as the p-value for the Hansen J test are 












Table A1. Sample of banks 
# Bank Country  
1 Erste Group Bank AG AT 
2 KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA-KBC Group BE 
3 Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-Bank of Cyprus Group CY 
4 Bayerische Landesbank DE 
5 Commerzbank AG DE 
6 DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale AG DE 
7 Deutsche Bank AG DE 
8 HSH Nordbank AG DE 
9 Hypo Real Estate Holding AG DE 
10 Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg DE 
11 Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen Girozentrale - HELABA DE 
12 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB DE 
13 Danske Bank A/S DK 
14 Jyske Bank A/S (Group) DK 
15 Nykredit Realkredit A/S DK 
16 Sydbank A/S DK 
17 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA-BBVA ES 
18 Banco Popular Espanol SA ES 
19 Banco Santander SA ES 
20 OP Financial Group FI 
21 BNP Paribas FR 
22 BPCE SA FR 
23 Crédit Agricole S.A. FR 
24 Société Générale SA FR 
25 Barclays Bank Plc GB 
26 HSBC Holdings Plc GB 
27 Lloyds Banking Group Plc GB 
28 Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) GB 
29 OTP Bank Plc HU 
30 AIB Group PLC IE 
31 Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland IE 
32 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena IT 
33 Banco Popolare società cooperativa IT 
34 Intesa Sanpaolo IT 
35 UniCredit SpA IT 
36 Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI Banca IT 
37 Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat Luxembourg LU 
38 Bank of Valletta Plc MT 
39 ABN AMRO Group N.V. NL 
40 ING Groep NV NL 
41 SNS Holding NL 
42 Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA - PKO BP SA PL 
43 Banco BPI SA PT 
44 Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp PT 
45 Caixa Geral de Depositos PT 
46 Nordea Bank AB (publ) SE 
47 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SE 
48 Svenska Handelsbanken AB SE 
49 Swedbank AB SE 
50 NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. SI 
51 Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. SI 
 Note: The table reports the list of 51 banks included in the whole sample, as well as their respective country ISO-code. 
